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1. INTRODUCTION  
We examine how labour market and welfare state reforms in the direction of flexicurity affect 
long-run unemployment and the dynamic response to international shocks of an economy 
characterised by a liberal welfare state regime.  An analysis of the behaviour of shares of 
different household income sources sheds light on the distributional impact of policy reforms 
and shocks.  
 Interest in the functioning of the labour market as a central determinant of unemployment 
and concerns about the falling shares of labour income vis-à-vis capital and profits have been 
heightened by, but well precede, the Great Recession.  On the one hand, labour market 
deregulation and welfare state retrenchments have been advocated as means to support 
employment1 and firms’ competitiveness against the challenges posed by globalisation.  On the 
other hand, a growing sense of insecurity is reflected in greater demand for stronger social 
safety nets.  The notion of flexicurity has been widely embraced as a guideline for welfare state 
reforms2 capable of addressing both of these concerns.  At its core lies the idea that insurance 
for the unemployed and protection of employment (rather than jobs) via active labour market 
policies (ALMPs) that enhance employability can be combined with reductions of labour 
market rigidities, thus allowing firms to respond flexibly to changes in competitive conditions.  
 Reforming a liberal welfare state system in the direction of flexicurity would entail reducing 
flexibility and increasing expenditure on passive labour market polices (PLMPs)3 and 
conventional wisdom suggests this would result in a worsening of labour market outcomes. We 
argue that an assessment of the effects of such a reform requires capturing (at least some of) 
the complex interaction between a multiplicity of policy instruments as well as key general 
equilibrium effects.4  To this end, we allow for a rich menu of both ALMPs and passive labour 
market policies within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open 
economy characterised by good and labour market imperfections and vertical linkages in 
production.  The basic structure of the labour market follows Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), 
with endogenous job creation and exogenous job destruction within a search and matching 
framework.  A key difference, as in Christoffel and Kuester (2008) and de Walque et al. (2009), 
is the presence of a public employment agency that acts as an intermediary between workers 
and firms.  In addition, since training policies are typically implemented as productivity-
enhancing treatments (Crépon et al., 2016), we assume that training expenditure is not a mere 
cost (as is typical in the literature, e.g. Stähler and Thomas, 2012), but also a means to increase 
the productivity of training.  Whilst assuming direct matching between workers and firms 
would not alter the results, our setup allows for a sharper distinction between ALMPs aimed at 
improving a worker’s matching probability (e.g. via higher vacancy creation) and those aimed 
at improving her employability.5  
                                                 
1 ‘Rigid’ labour markets have been held responsible for the weaker employment performance of Europe relative 
to the US. See, e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell, et al. (2005).  
2 These policies are central to the “European Employment Strategy” and are a cornerstone of the Social Investment 
model of the welfare state (European Commission, 2013).   
3 See OECD employment database (http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm). 
4  Crépon et al. (2016) argue that policy evaluations of individual instruments often suggest limited effectiveness 
because of their failure to capture equilibrium and feedback effects. 
5 Employment agencies are often privately owned, but in Europe there is a much stronger public presence, with 
governments either offering services directly or through public tenders. A recent European Labour Force Survey 
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 Starting from a liberal welfare system (such as the UK’s) with high flexibility and low 
unemployment insurance, we examine a range of reforms in the direction of a flexicurity system 
(such as that of Denmark) characterised by relatively high (but lower) flexibility, high 
unemployment insurance and ALMPs.  We begin by assessing the role of policy reforms in 
reshaping the long-run equilibrium of the economy.  We then investigate the extent to which 
these reforms alter the dynamic response of the economy to international (trade and external 
demand) shocks.  
 Our results suggest that reform packages exist that can improve upon the labour market 
outcomes of a liberal welfare state system.  When accompanied by ALMPs that foster 
employability and job creation, more generous PLMPs that offer higher protection to the 
unemployed can reduce unemployment and increase the level of economic activity.  
Interestingly, when leading to an increase in productivity, reforms shift household income 
shares away from labour and towards capital and profit income.  Furthermore, the dynamic 
adjustments of the economy following once-and-for-all negative external shocks (that reduce 
vacancy creation and increase aggregate unemployment) are found to differ pre- and post-
reform.  Even when they reduce labour market flexibility relative to a liberal welfare state and 
result in lower steady-state unemployment levels, reforms in the direction of flexicurity appear 
to increase volatility in employment and GDP in response to exogenous shocks.  An important 
result is that higher levels of training expenditure, by enhancing firms’ productivity, can reduce 
the adverse effects on GDP of negative shocks as well as dampen the amplification and 
persistence of these shocks on unemployment.  
 A strand of the literature to which our paper is related focuses on the effects of labour 
market reforms on labour market outcomes.  Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) examine the long-
run implications of product and labour market reforms.  Blanchard and Tirole (2008) stress the 
importance of considering policy combinations and study the joint determination of 
employment protection and unemployment benefits.  More recently, a number of papers capture 
the interaction between the key pillars of the flexicurity system.  Brown et al. (2009) develop a 
Markov model of the labour market with search frictions; starting from a calibration on 
Germany, a transition to the Danish flexicurity system is shown to have the potential to reduce 
unemployment and earning inequalities in Germany.  Davoine and Keuschnig (2015) consider 
the effects of flexicurity policies on job reallocation from declining to expanding sectors.  
Within a similar framework, Davoine (2015) shows that education can act as a self-insurance 
device.  Dabusinskas, et al. (2016) examine how differences in labour market institutions affect 
the dynamic adjustment of labour markets.  These contributions typically do not consider the 
interaction between labour markets and international openness.  In an asymmetric two country 
model, Felbermayr et al. (2013) show that labour market rigidities that increase unemployment 
in one country also do so in its trading partner, but do not examine the dynamic adjustments to 
shocks and their policy menu is more limited than in this paper.  
                                                 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/ data/database) shows great inter-country variability in the percentage of 
unemployed contacting private and public employment agencies: e.g. 4% and 44%, respectively, in Denmark and 
25% and 53% in the UK, with an EU average of 22% and 53.2%. Evaluations of private versus public services 
suggest the latter to be much more effective in improving employment outcomes (e.g, Behaghel et al., 2014 and 
Winterhager, 2006). 
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 Another strand of the literature examines the business cycle implications of economic 
integration.  Cacciatore et al. (2016a) study how the business cycle affects the dynamic impact 
of labour and product market reforms.  One key difference with our framework is that, given 
their aim to capture the effects of product market deregulation (in the form of reductions in 
market entry restrictions) for non-traded services and professions, they assume that the 
monopolistic good is non-traded.6 Within a similar framework, Cacciatore (2014) considers the 
effects of trade liberalisation with intercountry differences in labour market frictions.  Although 
these papers analyse some policy combinations, they restrict the policy menu to a subset of the 
institutional variables characterising flexicurity reforms.  
 The fact that international shocks and welfare-based tax-and-benefit policies are not 
distributionally neutral is receiving increasing recognition, with particular focus on the way 
they affect different income groups.  Our analysis sheds lights on the distributional impact of 
shocks and policy reforms, by tracing changes in shares of household income from different 
sources.7 A burgeoning literature highlights the role of technology in explaining the long-run 
(secular) trends in inequality (e.g.  Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014a,b; Piketty and Zucman, 
2014; Summers, 2014; Rognlie, 2014) but devotes little attention to effects of international 
shocks and policy reforms on the shares of income types in household income.8 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model.  Section 3 carries 
out the analysis of policy reforms and of the dynamic effects of exogenous shocks in the 
different policy regimes.  Section 4 concludes the paper.  
2. THE MODEL  
The economy consists of two vertically integrated sectors: a non-traded final good is produced 
competitively by aggregating imported and domestically produced varieties of an intermediate 
input.  The latter is produced by monopolistically competitive firms using capital and labour, 
assumed to be internationally mobile and immobile, respectively.  The economy is ‘small’ in 
the sense that it cannot affect the total aggregate demand for its exports, the price of the varieties 
it imports, and the world rate of return on capital.  The final good is used for public and private 
consumption as well as investment.  
2.1. Households 
The representative household owns the intermediate sector firms, supplies them with capital 
and labour, and uses capital accumulation to build its wealth.  At any time t, a continuum of 
household members, whose measure is normalised to unity, are either employed or 
                                                 
6 The tradability of the intermediate goods in a similar framework is assumed instead in Cacciatore et al. (2016b) 
who focus on the implications of market deregulation for monetary policy in a Monetary Union. 
7 A different strand of the literature considers the effects of trade on intra and inter-firm wage distribution, e.g. 
Egger and Kreikemeir (2012); Montagna and Nocco (2013); Helpman et al. (2016). In a model with directed job 
search and firm heterogeneity, Felbermayr et al. (2016) study the impact of policy reforms on wage dispersion 
across and within firms. Coşar et al. (2016) examine the interaction between trade and labour market liberalisation 
on firm dynamics, job turnover and wage distribution. Empirically, De Agostini et al. (2016), Biewen and Juhasz 
(2012) and Bargain et al. (2016) study the effects of welfare state policies on income distribution.  
8 Guvenen et al. (2014) study the effects of business cycle on individual earnings. 
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unemployed.  Those in employment, denoted by  0,1tN   , are trained by a hiring agency and 
negotiate with it hours of work and the hourly wage, denoted by nth  and 
n
tw , respectively.  The 
unemployed (1 tN ) receive an unemployment benefit tb  from the government and search for 
jobs available in the form of vacancies posted by the agency.9 We assume that members of the 
household completely insure each other against any income uncertainties by sharing all 
income.10  
 At any time t, the household faces the following intertemporal budget constraint for all 
0s  , 
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where , , , C I K   and T are measured in terms of the final good and respectively represent the 
real values of consumption, investment, capital stock, profit income and a lump sum tax paid 
to the government.  r is the domestic rate of return on capital while r* denotes its foreign 
equivalent.  Thus, the household receives capital income itt s s
i M
kr di

 , where M and ik  are the 
mass of firms (indexed by i) and firm i’s capital requirement, respectively.  The budget 
constraint above also reflects the economy’s international borrowing/lending of capital with an 
inflow (outflow) of capital corresponding to  0 0 .t s
i
it
M
sk dK i

     We further assume that 
the interest rate differential is determined by the extent of capital mobility and invoke   
  
*
t s t s
M
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
 
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 , (2) 
where 0   is an exogenously fixed inverse measure of capital mobility: for any given , a 
rise in excess demand for capital increases the right-hand-side of (2) which raises r above *r ; 
0   implies perfect mobility, where *r r  always holds;    implies no mobility and 
M
i
i
Kk di

  ought to hold for any r and 
*r .  The stock of capital depreciates at the constant 
rate  , leading to the capital accumulation process 
   1 1t s t s t sK I K       .  (3) 
 The household, assumed to be infinitely-lived, maximises the expected present value of 
lifetime utility  
                                                 
9 No conditionality is assumed on the receipt of unemployment benefits as in, e.g., Andersen and Svarer (2014) 
who address the moral hazard problem associated with unemployment insurance and show that it can be mitigated 
by imposing workfare requirements on the eligibility for unemployment support. 
10 See, e.g., Andolfatto (1996). 
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where tE  is the expectations operator conditional on the information available at time t, 
 0,1   is the subjective time preference discount factor, and   captures the relative weight 
of disutility of work.  The household’s optimization problem at this stage therefore is to choose 
the paths of consumption and capital stock  1 0, t s t s sC K

   
 which maximise (4) subject to (1), 
(2) and (3), while taking tK  and  *
0
, , , , , ,, ,t s it s t s t s t s t s
n n
t s t s t s
s
w h N k r r T b

      

   as given.  
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the optimisation by t s , the first order 
conditions can be shown to satisfy  
    0; 0ct t
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For later use, we define 
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as the stochastic real discount factor used in discounting the future values of the variables as 
appropriate.  
2.2. The final good sector 
The homogenous final good is produced by a competitive sector according to a CES technology 
that aggregates domestically produced and imported varieties of a differentiated product:  
     
*
1
1 1/1 1
1 1/ 1 1/
* * , dt it it
i M i M
Y M y di M y di

 
 

  
 
 
  
 
 
    (8) 
where Y is the quantity of the final good, diy  and 
*
iy  are the quantities of the domestically 
produced and imported varieties of the differentiated product, M  and *M  denote the respective 
mass of available varieties, and 1   is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. 
The sector’s profit is   
  
*
* *d d
Yt t t it it it it
i M i M
tPY p y di p y di
 
 
    
 
 
  , (9) 
where P, dip  and 
*
ip  are the prices of the final good and of the domestic and foreign 
intermediates, respectively, and 1   represents the per-unit iceberg trade cost incurred in 
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importing.11  Taking all prices and the trade cost as given, and choosing  dity  and 
*
ity  to maximise 
Yt  subject to (8), the intermediate demand functions by the final good sector are 
  , ,
d
d t it
it
t
Y p
y i M
M P

 
  
 
 (10) 
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 
 (11) 
 Invoking the zero profit condition implied by the perfect competition assumption and using 
(9), (10) and (11), we obtain the price index dual to (8) 
 
     
*
1
1
1 1
*
*
1 1d
t it it
i
t
M i M
P p di p di
M M

 


 
 
 
  
 
 
  . (12) 
2.3. The intermediate sector 
The intermediate sector is monopolistically competitive and each firm i M produces a single 
variety of the good facing the domestic demand in (10) and the foreign demand 
   
*
x dt
it itt
F
y p
M



 , (13) 
where *F  is an exogenous scale factor measuring real foreign expenditure on this good and  
and  are the same as for the domestic sector. The total demand facing the firm at period t is 
  g d xit it i tt itz y y y   ,  (14) 
where gity  is the government’s demand which is explained later.  
 Each variety is produced using a composite input (a) comprising capital (k) and ‘effective’ 
labour man-hours (l). Using a Cobb-Douglas technology, we define the input basket of the 
representative firms by   
  
1
1
; 0 1it itit
l k
a
 

 
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
   
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 (15) 
and assume an input requirement of  
  
it itz a , (16) 
where 0   is the total factor productivity parameter, common to all firms.  Total cost is  
  a
t it t it t itp a wl rk  , (17) 
                                                 
11 Thus, for a firm to use one unit of the foreign good, ϕ ≥ 1 units need to be shipped.  
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where ap  denotes the unit input cost and w is the hourly wage paid by the firm.  Given (15) 
and (17), cost minimisation implies  
   1t
a
t twp r
  . (18) 
The input demands of firm i, obtained by applying Shephard’s lemma to (17), imply  
  at it t itwl p a , (19) 
   1 at it t itrk p a .   (20) 
 Finally, the real profit of firm i is  
  
d
ait
it it t it
t
p
z p a
P

 
  
 
.  (21) 
Maximisation of (21) subject to (10), (13) and (14) yields the price mark-up equation 
  
 1
d
it
t
a
tp
P
p
 


.  (22) 
2.4. The labour market  
In the labour market, a public employment agency acts as an intermediary between labour 
demand and supply by creating and filling job vacancies and training the workers.  We assume 
that job losses occur at an exogenous constant rate 12 and that the number of job seekers in 
each period is given only by those who began the period without a job  1 tN .  Denoting the 
number of vacancies by tV , the aggregate matching function is  
1 1t t tN V
  M , where 
0   and  0,1 .  Assuming that those newly-hired in a period start working at the 
beginning of the following period, the number of employed workers evolves according to 
  1 11t t tNN     M .
13  
 Each period the agency trains all the workers it has hired by converting n
th  man-hours 
supplied by a worker into 
th  effective man-hours which are offered to the intermediate firms at 
the hourly rate tw .  Training occurs according to the concave technology           
    , 0 1nttt
e
h h



   , (23) 
                                                 
12 Hall (2005) documents that a large percentage of the variation of employment over the business cycle is 
explained by variations in vacancy creation rather than job separation rate. For simplicity, we therefore follow the 
literature (e.g., Blanchard and Gali, 2010) in assuming that job separations are exogenous. 
13 An alternative is to distinguish between the unemployed and the effective job seekers defining them by 
1t tu N   and 11 (1 )t tU N    , respectively, and assume that new hires start working in the period they are 
matched, so that 
t t tu U M  (e.g., Blanchard and Gali, 2010). 
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where 0te   is a measure of the productivity of training.
14 Conventionally, training 
expenditure is modelled merely as a cost (e.g. Pissarides, 2009; Stähler and Thomas, 2012).  
We however allow such expenditure to be also productivity-enhancing on the grounds that it is 
typically aimed at increasing (and hence may have an effect on) the human capital and 
employability of the workforce.15 In particular, we assume that the productivity coefficient te  
depends positively on the per-capita expenditure on training (measured in units of the final 
good), T
tx , according to  
    1 exp 1
T
t
t T
x
e e e
x
 
   
             
, (24) 
where 
Tx and e  are base values of T
tx  and te  respectively and  0,1   ensures decreasing 
returns to training expenditure.  Thus, 
te e  if either e   or  
T T
tx x , and 
T T
t tx x e e    
as long as e  , and hence Tx  can be thought of as an active labour market policy instrument 
that influences workers’ employability.    
 The value of a job to the agency ( J
t ) is given by its current net revenue and the discounted 
future value of the job if it survives separation:  
    1 11
n nJ J
t t t t
T
t tt t t th w h xw f E           ,  (25) 
where f is a government imposed firing cost per job loss, which occurs at the rate .  The value 
of an open vacancy to the agency ( V
t ) is given by its discounted future value less its current 
cost, where the latter is equivalent to the expected gain arising from future matches,   
    1 1 11VV J Vt t t t t t Vt tVE q xq           ,  (26) 
V
tx  is the per unit cost of creating and posting a vacancy (measured in terms of the final good) 
and 
V
tq  is the vacancy filling rate.  
 The condition that eliminates any incentives for other competing agencies to be set up is 
0, 0Vt s s    , and holds if  
  
1 1 
J
t t
V V
tt tEqx    ,  (27) 
which equates the current actual cost of creating a vacancy to the expected value of the 
corresponding hired worker’s contribution.  Equations (25) and (27) then imply 
                                                 
14 This is in line with Christoffel and Kuester (2008) and de Walque et al. (2009). The function in (23) ought to 
be sufficiently concave to generate n
t th h   at very low values of h. 
15 The meta-analysis by Card et al (2015) suggests that the direct treatment effects of ALMPs vary depending on 
time horizon, type of programme, and participant groups. Overall, training programmes appear to work better for 
the long term unemployed. Aggregate cross-country evidence (e.g. OECD, 2004) points to a positive correlation 
between training and the probability of finding employment.  
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and the condition governing vacancy posting activity is given by 
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 . (28) 
The first term on the right-hand-side is the expected net return and the second term reflects the 
expectations of corresponding future activity.   
 A worker’s net pay-off from employment is given by  
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            
 
.  (29) 
where Utq  is the job-finding rate. The terms on the right-hand-side are, respectively, wage 
income, the value of the reservation wage, and the continuation value of employment if the 
match lasts.  
 We assume that ntw  and 
n
th  are determined by efficient Nash bargaining between the 
household members and the hiring agency.  Specifically, maximisation of   
   
1
W J V
t t t
 
   , where  0,1  denotes a worker’s relative bargaining power, subject to 
(25) to (29), yields the match surplus sharing rule,  
 
   1 W Jt t    ,  (30) 
resulting in the following wage bill of the agency (or wage income of the worker): 
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

 
     






,  (31) 
where  / 1t t tNV    measures the ‘degree of market tightness’.  Ceteris paribus, the total 
rent from employment extracted by the household is higher the larger is the profit of the 
employment agency, the tighter is the labour market, and the higher is the workers’ outside 
option.  It can be easily verified that the bargained real wage bill can be expressed as 
 , ,1B t
n n
Bt ttw w wh     , where ,B tw  and ,B tw  denote respectively the maximum wage bill the 
agency is willing to pay an employee (satisfying 0Jt  ) and the minimum wage bill an 
employee is willing to accept to form a job match (satisfying 0Wt  ).
16  
                                                 
16 The bargaining set is , ,B t tt BwS w  . Equation (30) then implies  1t
J
tS   and t t
W S  . 
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 Finally, the bargained hours equalise a worker’s marginal rate of substitution between 
leisure and consumption and the value of her marginal product to the hiring agency, hence 
satisfying 
 
 
1
Λ
hn
t n
t t
t
te w
h
h


 
 .     
2.5. The government  
The government maintains a balanced budget in each period which finances its expenditure on 
public consumption (G) and its unemployment benefit bill via lump-sum taxation and the hiring 
agency’s net revenue:17  
     1 ,
g
n n T Vt t
t t t t t tt t t t
t
t
p G
N b T N w h w h x x V
P
         (32) 
where g
tp  is the public good price index, G is a CES basket of domestically produced the 
intermediates  
   
1
1 1 1/1 1/
g
t it
i M
G M y di


 

 
  
 
 , (33) 
and  
  ,
d
g t it
it g
t
G p
y i M
M p

 
  
 
,  (34) 
is its demand for a typical variety, which satisfies d g g
it it t t
i M
p y di p G

  and implies   
   
1
111g d
t it
i M
p p di
M
 

 
  
 
 . (35) 
2.6. General equilibrium 
The labour market clearing condition is  
  t t ti
i M
N h dil

  ,  (36) 
                                                 
17 Given that the hiring agency is publicly owned, its contemporaneous net revenue accrues to the government and 
this ensures that the good market clearing condition holds. The fact that this source of income contributes to the 
financing of other labour market policies (e.g. unemployment benefits) and transfers is broadly consistent with 
Blanchard and Tirole’s (2008) argument that unemployment benefits ought to be funded via firing taxes rather 
than other taxes. Note that were the agency’s contemporaneous net revenue zero, the fact that in the steady-state 
successful matches should be equal to job losses so as to sustain a constant unemployment rate would imply a 
negative expected net revenue for the agency in the steady-state, which would eliminate any incentive for such an 
agency to exist, therefore justifying agency’s positive contemporaneous net revenue.  
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and the balance of payments condition requires the trade balance to be offset by the interest 
payments on net capital flows,  
  
*
* *
*
d x
it it it it
t i t
t t
t t
t
i M i Mi M
p y p y
rdi di dik K
P P
 
 
 
   
 
   . (37) 
The national income identity requires  
  
*
g
T V t t
t t t t t t t t i
t
t
i M
t
p G
dGDP C I x N x V ir k K
P

 
       
 
 , (38) 
where  
   t t it t it
i
t i
M
GDP w l r k di

   .  (39) 
 Finally, given that all firms in the intermediate sector face similar cost and demand 
functions, in equilibrium they will be identical.  Therefore, for any firm-level variable 
itx  we 
shall drop the subscript i and use the aggregation 
t ti
i M
dMx ix

  .   
3. POLICY ANALYSIS 
In this section we examine the effects of different permanent reforms and transitory shocks on 
labour market outcomes and on the shares of different income sources in household income.18  
 In our model, the labour share in household gross income (HGI) can be written as 
n n n nNw h Nwh Nw h GDP
HGI GDP Nwh HGI
 .  The labour income share of GDP,  / 1 /Nwh GDP     , is 
constant given the assumed technology; however, the other two ratios on the right-hand-side 
vary due to labour market imperfections (that result in a wedge between the gross wage income 
received by the worker and the gross wage paid by the firm) and net exports and transfers (that 
generate a wedge between household gross income and GDP.  Similarly, whilst the capital 
income and profit shares of GDP are also constant, they vary depending on the wedge between 
GDP and household income.  Figure 1 illustrates, for a selection of countries for the period 
1991-2014, that the volatility of wage income as a share of household income is indeed higher 
than as a share of GDP.  Since they reflect the role of transfers and taxation, household incomes 
are also arguably a better reflection of living standards than factor income shares (e.g., 
Atkinson, 2013).  
 
Figure 1 around here 
 
                                                 
18 Whilst a representative agent framework is not the best vehicle to analyse issues of income distribution, models 
with consumer heterogeneity have been shown to give near equivalence inequality results with representative 
agent real business cycle models (Krusell and Smith, 1998). 
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3.1. Welfare state reforms 
At the core of flexicurity is the combination of relatively low degrees of employment protection 
with generous unemployment support accompanied by the adoption of ALMPs aimed at 
increasing employability and improving the quality of matching in the labour market.  
 Starting from a benchmark scenario that could be thought of as representing a liberal 
welfare system (characterised by high flexibility and low unemployment insurance), we 
consider the effects of permanent reforms towards a flexicurity system with relatively high 
flexibility and unemployment insurance, and an emphasis on ALMPs.  We define a reform as 
a permanent change in a set of exogenous variables of the benchmark (i.e. pre-reform) 
calibration of the model.  The new steady-state solutions then represent the post-reform 
economy.  
 Taking the UK as an example of a liberal welfare system, we calibrate the steady-state ‘pre-
reform’ benchmark version of the model using UK data.  For the freely determined parameters, 
we use values that are commonly used in similar studies (see the online Appendix for details).  
We assume *r r  to hold in the steady-state: there is no capital flows and the trade balance is 
satisfied.  Using Denmark as an example of a flexicurity system, the relevant parameters in the 
benchmark model are changed in the direction of and by a proportion consistent with taking the 
UK values closer to the corresponding Danish ones.  Therefore, we are not contrasting different 
welfare state regimes across countries (which would require different initial calibrations) but 
examining how reforms in a given economy affect its performance.  
 Interestingly, relative to the UK, the Danish flexicurity system is characterised by higher 
security (higher unemployment benefit rates) and greater rigidity (reflected in a higher firing 
cost), alongside a lower vacancy creation cost and higher training expenditure.  Thus, we shall 
consider the following changes to the four policy ingredients that in our model capture the key 
pillars of flexicurity:  
(a) An increase in unemployment benefit rate (b); 
(b) An increase in per-capita training expenditure (
Tx ); 
(c) An increase in firing cost (f) ;  
(d) A reduction in unit vacancy creation cost (
Vx ).   
These policies are then combined to obtain the following four ‘reform packages’ (denoted by 
RP1 to RP4): 
RP1:  comprising (a) & (b)  
RP2:  comprising (a) & (c)  
RP3:  comprising (a), (c) & (d)  
RP4:  comprising (a), (b), (c) & (d)  
RP4 corresponds to a ‘full’ move towards the Danish system.  However, from a positive as well 
as normative perspective, it proves informative to consider the other intermediate reform 
packages, particularly since considerable heterogeneity persists within Europe in the emphases 
placed on different individual welfare state elements.  
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 Table 1 shows how the benchmark values of selected variables are affected when the 
policies outlined in (a) to (d) above are implemented in isolation.  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
 Comparing the columns labelled ‘Benchmark’ and (a) in Table 1 reveals that an increase in 
b reduces vacancies and the number of labour market matches, and results in higher 
unemployment and lower GDP.  By increasing a worker’s outside option, the policy raises the 
acceptable minimum wage bill required to form a match (
,B tw ), resulting in a lower marginal 
gain from hiring for the employment agency, which reduces the number of vacancies created.  
The Beveridge curve equilibrium then requires the resulting reduction in labour market 
tightness to be accompanied by an increase in unemployment.  In addition, the higher wage 
paid by firms reduces the marginal product of capital and leads to a negative interest rate 
differential and to a reduction in investment and capital stock.  The increase in the (relative) 
price of the typical domestic variety ( dp ) result in greater outsourcing (a larger share of 
imported intermediates) and in a fall in aggregate profits.  Despite the higher unemployment, 
the reform reallocates household gross and disposable income away from capital and profits 
towards labour income.  These results are broadly consistent with the conventional view that 
PLMPs are ultimately contractionary.  
 As is evident from column (c), an increase in  f  mildly raises unemployment.19  The policy 
reduces the value of a job to the agency ( J ) and the maximum wage bill the agency is willing 
to pay an employee (
,B tw ). The job creation condition in (28) then implies a scaling back on 
vacancy creation, leading to lower market tightness and job finding rates and to a downward 
movement along the Beveridge curve.  By inducing workers to accept lower wages, the policy 
results in a (mild) redistribution away from labour income.   
 The impacts of an increase in training expenditure (
Tx ) and a reduction in vacancy creation 
cost (
Vx ), reported in columns (b) and (d) respectively, are quantitatively more substantial. 
Although both policies result in an upward movement along the Beveridge curve, increasing 
vacancy creation and reducing unemployment, the effects of an increase in Tx  are relatively 
stronger.  A higher Tx  has two opposing effects on the job creation condition.  First, by 
increasing the cost of a match, it reduces J , thus working towards a reduction in vacancies.  
Second, the productivity-enhancing effect of training increases / nh h  and J , thus dominating 
the former effect and resulting in a much greater vacancy creation and lower unemployment.  
The higher productivity also raises the marginal product of capital and triggers an incipient 
positive interest rate differential that results in higher investment and capital stock.  The 
substantial increase in price competitiveness reduces outsourcing and leads to a large increase 
in profits that dominates the increase in wage income, explaining a fall in household’s labour 
income share. For a given degree of market tightness, a reduction in Vx  increases vacancy 
                                                 
19 Empirical evidence shows that employment protection tends to have small and ambiguous effects on 
employment (e.g. OECD, 2013).   
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creation and market tightness (θ).  This results in a higher total rent from employment extracted 
by a worker and explains the redistribution effects of Vx  towards wage income.  
 Having examined the impact of individual policies in isolation, Table 2 reports the effects 
of the reform packages specified above.   
 
Table 2 around here 
 
 RP1 combines an increase in unemployment benefit with an increase in the training 
expenditure per worker and places emphasis on providing security to the unemployed while 
increasing employability.  This reform results in an upward movement along the Beveridge 
curve and its expansionary nature leads to a substantial increase in GDP since the positive 
employment effect induced by the increase in Tx  dominates the negative effect of the rise in b.  
Thus, when combined with greater investment in workers’ productivity, higher unemployment 
insurance increases firms’ productivity, reduces outsourcing, and raises GDP.  It reduces, 
however, the wage share of household’s disposable income.  
 RP2 combines an increase in unemployment benefits with an increase in firing costs, and 
results in a redistribution of income towards wages.  However, consistent with the effects of 
the individual policy instruments, the share of imported varieties increases, as does 
unemployment, and the resulting contractionary downward move along the Beveridge curve 
reduces GDP.  
 By augmenting RP2 with a reduction in the vacancy creation costs, RP3 reverses the 
contractionary outcome of RP2 and leads to a rise in vacancies, lower unemployment and 
higher GDP, while income shares change in favour of wage earners.  RP4, which combines all 
the policies, is the most comprehensive step towards the Danish flexicurity system and has the 
greatest effects in terms of unemployment reduction and economy wide expansion, whilst 
reducing the wage share in total income. 
 The above results suggest that reform packages combining PLMPs and ALMPs exist that 
can improve upon the labour market outcomes of a liberal welfare state system.  In particular, 
when accompanied by ALMPs that foster employability and job creation, more generous 
support for the unemployed can, in fact, reduce unemployment and increase the level of 
economic activity.  These reforms also tend to reduce the share of wage and raise that of capital 
and profits in household income; although this could be seen as counterintuitive at first glance, 
it is explained by the higher productivity and lower outsourcing that ensue the reforms. 
3.2. Impact of international shocks 
We now compare the impact of international shocks to the foreign demand scale factor ( *F ) 
and to the trade cost () on the economy before and after the implementation of the different 
reform packages discussed above, thus shedding light on how reforms alter the short-run 
behaviour of the economy.  To this end, the log-linearised version of the model is augmented 
with a stochastic AR(1) process which is assumed to generate the path of the exogenous 
variable that is subjected to the shock, and the corresponding impulse responses are used to 
examine the adjustment of the economy in the short-run.  
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3.2.1. Shock propagation in the benchmark model 
The first and second columns of Figure 2 display, respectively, the impulse responses of key 
endogenous variables to exogenous negative once-and-for-all shocks to foreign demand (i.e. a 
fall in *F ) and to trade (i.e. an increase ).20   
 Both shocks have the same qualitative effects on labour market outcomes:  the number of 
vacancies, labour market tightness and the job finding probability fall, thus leading to a rise in 
unemployment.  Also, in both cases, consumption, investment, final good output and GDP all 
fall.  Due to the fact that they affect the economy through different channels, the two shocks, 
however, have different quantitative effects, with the shock to  having a much greater impact 
than the shock to F*. Whilst a fall in F* directly reduces demand for the exported varieties, an 
increase in  directly raises the prices at the point of delivery of both exported and imported 
varieties and thus leads to a fall in the demand for both exports ( xy ) and imports ( *y ).  As a 
result, the two shocks have a different impact on the price index P. Specifically, in both cases, 
the fall in xy  reduces firm output and profit and leads to a reduction in vacancy creation and 
firm-level wage.  The latter works towards a lower price for domestic intermediates and a lower 
price level.  A negative trade shock, however, increases the cost of imported varieties and puts 
an upward pressure on P, an effect compounded by the lower competitive pressure on domestic 
producers who push up variety prices.  Hence, whilst P falls after a negative foreign demand 
shock, it increases following a trade shock, with a negative pecuniary externality on the 
downstream final good sector which experiences a larger drop in productivity.  Thus, although 
it induces a larger increase in the demand facing domestic upstream producers by triggering a 
substitution away from foreign and towards domestic varieties of the intermediate goods, a 
trade shock leads to larger growth in unemployment and output contractions.   
 
Figure 2 around here 
 
 Both shocks also reduce household disposable income (HDI): the higher unemployment 
benefit income due to rising unemployment, is not sufficient to offset the effect on HDI of 
lower wage, capital and profit income.21 
 These results are broadly consistent with the UK performance during the great recession.  
Joyce and Sibieta (2013) report a drop in labour income between 2008 and 2009 driven mostly 
by a lower employment rate and a decline in hours worked.  During the same period, there was 
also a decrease in both the income distributed from firms (e.g. dividends) and the net operating 
surplus received by households, with only a minimal recovery recorded in 2010 in both cases.22 
Household investment and the interest rate also declined between 2008 and 2010 (Jenkins et 
al., 2013).  Consistent with this, we find both negative shocks to generate a trade deficit and a 
capital outflow resulting in a fall in r.   
                                                 
20 The complete set of IRFs are available in the online Appendix. 
21 Joyce and Sibieta (2013) find that social welfare expenditures contributed positively to the UK’s HDI between 
2008 and 2009. However, this expenditure includes other forms of welfare spending such as child benefits which 
we do not consider here. Jenkins et al. (2013) show that net of these categories of expenditures, HDI fell in the 
UK between 2007 and 2009, driven mostly by the fall in wage income and operating surplus. 
22 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sector-accounts/data/database. 
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  The two shocks also have non-neutral effects on incomes shares, as shown in Figure 3.  In 
both cases, on impact, income is redistributed towards primary factors of production and away 
from profits.  This is because while both wage and capital income fall in response to the shocks, 
HDI falls by more due to the larger drop in profit income.  As with the labour market 
implications of the shock, the redistributive effects of an increase in  are considerably larger 
than those of a fall in *F :  by increasing P, the negative trade shock has a larger ‘depressive’ 
effect on the downstream sector’s productivity and employment which results in a larger fall in 
HDI, consumption and investment while also stimulating a relatively larger fall in the domestic 
return to capital that results in a larger capital outflow.  
 Thus, depending on their source, negative international shocks will have different 
quantitative short-run consequences for labour market outcomes and household income shares.  
Specifically, we find that because the economy is characterised by vertical linkages (that 
generate aggregate scale economies) a shock that reduces trade in intermediate inputs can have 
stronger aggregate effects than a negative demand shock.  Our findings are broadly supported 
by Chowla, et al. (2014) who find that shocks to export prices (not including oil prices) had a 
more significant impact on the UK economy than foreign demand shocks.  
 
Figure 3 around here 
3.2.2. Welfare state reforms and shock propagation 
To examine how labour market and welfare state reforms affect shock propagation, we compare 
the impacts of the negative shocks pre- and post-reform.  The impulse response functions for 
key variables are displayed in Figure 4. 
   
Figure 4 around here 
 
 The post-reform effects of the shocks are qualitatively similar to those observed in the 
benchmark case.  However, inspection of the impulse responses reveals that the post-reform 
economy tends to be more volatile in response to shocks, even when a reform package has 
reduced steady-state unemployment.  Both the speed of the initial response of unemployment 
and its peak effects are more enhanced in the post-reform relative to the pre-reform regimes, 
with the highest effects occurring in post-RP2 and post-RP3, and the lowest in post-RP1.  
 These results may appear counterintuitive considering that RP1 is the only reform 
combination that does not include an increase in firing cost, f.  However, with reforms that 
increase unemployment benefits, workers appropriate a larger share of the match surplus which 
reduces the value of a job and vacancy creation.  Thus, a shock which further reduces the returns 
to a job match will result in a higher unemployment response (consistent with the findings of 
Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008, and Shimer, 2005).  The largest adverse effects in terms of 
unemployment adjustments following a shock occur in post-RP3 and RP2.  This is because not 
only are both associated with higher unemployment benefits, but they also involve higher firing 
costs, which further shrinks the initial value of a match.  In post-RP1 (the regime with the 
lowest unemployment response) the negative effect of the higher unemployment benefit is 
moderated by the higher per-capita training expenditure which raises the efficiency of training 
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and match productivity.  The effect of a higher per-capita training expenditure on match 
productivity also plays a key role in attenuating the amplification of unemployment under post-
RP4.  In fact, not only does a higher training expenditure offset the negative effects of a higher 
unemployment benefit and stricter firing rules, but it also tends to reduce the persistence of 
shocks on unemployment.  Additionally, our simulations reveal that reforms characterised by 
higher training costs, by increasing workers’ productivity, help mitigate  high output collapses 
in the event of negative international shocks, as evident by the response of GPD whose largest 
drop also occurs under post-RP2 and RP3.  
 Reforms also significantly alter the redistributive effects of shocks and an overarching 
finding of the paper is that reforms which redistribute income away from labour in the long-
run tend to weaken the effect of the shock on the wage share of household income.  
 In sum, the results discussed in this section suggest that reforming a liberal welfare state in 
the direction of flexicurity that combines generous unemployment support with ALMPs can 
improve labour market outcomes in the long-run.  Somewhat counterintuitively, these reforms 
(especially when not characterised by investment in individual workers’ skills) appear to result 
in a higher economic volatility, e.g. greater responses of unemployment and GDP to exogenous 
foreign shocks.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher employment protection and 
unemployment insurance do not provide a greater buffer against adverse exogenous events.  
Instead, an increase in investment in workers’ skills (as captured in this model by training 
expenditure) is found to play a fundamental role in enhancing an economy’s ability to adjust to 
negative shocks and in moderating GDP contractions.  
These findings germinate clear hypotheses that can be tested empirically, a task that lies 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, the crude evidence we provide in Figure 5, which 
compares the volatility of unemployment and GDP in Denmark and the UK, suggests that our 
theoretical results are not at odds with empirical stylised facts.  Consistent with our analysis, 
whilst the unemployment rate in the UK is higher than in Denmark (with the exception of the 
2014-2016 interval), the volatility of unemployment is higher in Denmark.  Similarly, Danish 
GDP is characterised by a higher volatility than the UK’s.  Clearly, a note of caution is 
necessary in interpreting this evidence.  It is important to reiterate that our theoretical analysis 
is not an ‘inter-country’ comparison between different welfare state regimes, which would 
entail comparing economies characterised by different initial calibrations.  Rather, we ask how 
an economy, given its initial structural characteristics, would perform were it to introduce 
reforms in a certain direction.   In addition, the stylised nature of our model implies that it 
cannot fully capture the differences between the two economies’ welfare and labour market 
systems.  For instance, the model does not reflect the different nature of job creation in the two 
countries, with the UK’s recent employment performance having been underpinned by a greater 
reliance on temporary or zero-hour contract jobs.23  
 
Figure 5 around here 
 
                                                 
23 As an indicator, the share of involuntary temporary as a percentage of all temporary jobs in the UK is higher 
than in Denmark (European Commission, 2014). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
Flexicurity has typically been advocated as a means to addressing concerns about both an 
economy’s ability to flexibility respond to changing economic conditions and the growing 
sense of insecurity resulting from labour market deregulation.  Our results suggest that reforms 
of a flexible liberal welfare state system in the direction of flexicurity can improve labour 
market outcomes and increase the level of economic activity when they combine greater income 
support for the unemployed and stronger firing restrictions with active labour market policies 
that enhance employability and job creation.  
 As expected, negative international shocks reduce vacancy creation and increase aggregate 
unemployment and are also not distributionally neutral.  The dynamic adjustments of the 
economy following once-and-for-all external shocks differs pre- and post-reform.  Even when 
they result in lower steady-state unemployment levels, reforms in the direction of flexicurity 
appear to lead to a higher volatility in unemployment and GDP in response to exogenous 
foreign shocks.  
 A compelling result of this study is that investment in workers’ skill can help moderate the 
impact of negative international shocks.  Not only does it reduce the volatility in 
unemployment, by shortening its persistence, but it also lessens the contraction in GDP 
following a negative foreign shock.  More generally, our analysis suggests that productivity 
enhancing policies can complement social protection in countering the effects of negative 
shocks, thus pointing to the importance of considering the interdependencies between different 
policy areas (such as for example labour market, education, and industrial policies).  
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Table 1.  Effects of permanent changes in individual policy instruments 
 
Variables Benchmark (a) (b) (c) (d) 
GDP 1 0.9936 1.3795 0.9999 1.0048 
Unemployment 0.0720 0.0768 0.0665 0.0720 0.0609 
Job Value to agency  1.2645 1.0226 1.6450 1.2624 1.0978 
Vacancies 0.0504 0.0405 0.0659 0.0503 0.0885 
Price Index 0.9700 0.9707 0.9363 0.9700 0.9695 
Matches 0.0353 0.0351 0.0357 0.0353 0.0357 
Price of an Intermediate Variety  1.0928 1.0941 1.0347 1.0928 1.0919 
Import Share of Intermediates in Input 0.0176 0.0177 0.0153 0.0176 0.0176 
Wage Rate (Firm-Level) 3.4119 3.4140 3.3200 3.4119 3.4103 
Bargained Wage Rate (per Worker) 2.1296 2.1761 2.7563 2.1278 2.1581 
HH Gross Income (HGI) 0.9415 0.9513 1.2587 0.9410 0.9515 
Wage & Benefit Income of HH / HGI 0.5406 0.5483 0.5260 0.5404 0.5432 
Profit Income of HH / HGI 0.2124 0.2089 0.2192 0.2125 0.2112 
Capital Income of HH / HGI 0.2467 0.2429 0.2549 0.2471 0.2456 
Tax paid by HH / HGI 0.2179 0.2237 0.1564 0.2174 0.2155 
Wage Income of / HDI 0.6790 0.6869 0.6157 0.6784 0.6824 
Wage & Benefit Income of HH / HDI 0.6911 0.7063 0.6234 0.6905 0.6925 
Capital Income of HH / HDI 0.3158 0.3129 0.3021 0.3158 0.3130 
Profit Income of / HDI 0.2716 0.2691 0.2598 0.2716 0.2692 
Investment / HDI 0.2256 0.2235 0.2158 0.2256 0.2236 
Investment / GDP 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 
Consumption / HDI 0.7744 0.7765 0.7856 0.7766 0.7764 
Consumption / GDP 0.5703 0.5772 0.637 0.5773 0.5768 
HH and HDI are ‘Household’ and ‘Household Disposable Income’, respectively. The Benchmark calibration 
is based on the UK data. Column (a): increase in b;  column (b): increase in 
Tx ; column (c): increase in f; 
column (d): reduction in 
Vx . Policy changes are chosen on the basis of Danish data and are all in the 
magnitudes of 50% change relative to the Benchmark column except for column (b) which involves 250% 
change.   
 
  
  
23 
 
Table 2.  Effects of permanent reform packages 
Variables 
Bench- 
mark 
RP1 
 
(a) & (b) 
RP2 
 
(a) & (c) 
RP3 
(a), (c) 
& (d) 
RP4 
(a), (b), 
(c) & (d) 
GDP 1 1.3736 0.9935 0.9992 1.3809 
Unemployment 0.0720 0.0695 0.0768 0.0609 0.0588 
Job Value to agency  1.2645 1.4199 1.0203 0.8855 1.2294 
Vacancies 0.0504 0.0567 0.0404 0.0712 0.0994 
Price Index 0.9700 0.9368 0.9707 0.9701 0.9362 
Matches 0.0353 0.0354 0.0351 0.0356 0.0358 
Price of an Intermediate Variety  1.0928 1.0354 1.0941 1.0930 1.0345 
Import Share of Intermediates in Input 0.0176 0.0153 0.0177 0.0176 0.0153 
Wage Rate (Firm-Level) 3.4119 3.3211 3.4140 3.4122 3.3198 
Bargained Wage Rate (per Worker) 2.1296 2.1761 2.1743 2.1970 2.8283 
HH Gross Income (HGI) 0.9415 1.2678 0.9509 0.9596 1.2798 
Wage & Benefit Income of HH / HGI 0.5406 0.5314 0.5481 0.5496 0.5333 
Profit Income of HH / HGI 0.2124 0.2167 0.2090 0.2082 0.2158 
Capital Income of HH / HGI 0.2467 0.2519 0.2430 0.2421 0.2509 
Tax paid by HH / HGI 0.2179 0.1607 0.2233 0.2201 0.1584 
Wage Income of / HDI 0.6790 0.6210 0.6863 0.6886 0.6235 
Wage & Benefit Income of HH / HDI 0.6911 0.6331 0.7056 0.6925 0.6337 
Capital Income of HH / HDI 0.3158 0.3002 0.3128 0.3130 0.2981 
Profit Income of / HDI 0.2716 0.2582 0.2690 0.2692 0.2564 
Investment / HDI 0.2256 0.2144 0.2234 0.2236 0.2129 
Investment / GDP 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 
Consumption / HDI 0.7744 0.7856 0.7766 0.7783 0.7871 
Consumption / GDP 0.5703 0.6086 0.5773 0.5830 0.6139 
See notes to Table 1. RP1 to RP4 refer to the reform packages proposed above.  
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Figure 1.  Comparison of the volatility of wage income shares in household income and in GDP 
Denmark’s share of wage income 
 
SD = [3.00   1.13] 
UK’s share of wage income 
 
SD = [1.83    1.09] 
 
Germany’s share of wage income 
 
SD = [1.08    0.866] 
 
Sweden’s share of wage income 
 
SD = [2.40    1.11] 
HGI is the household gross income and SD is the standard deviation of the series. The series in the graphs are the 
annual changes in the respective shares. 
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Figure 2.  Effects of stochastic negative shocks to foreign demand and trade  
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Figure 3. Redistributive effects of stochastic negative foreign demand and trade shocks   
Shock to F* Shock to  
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 Figure 4. Effects of negative foreign demand and trade shocks before and after reforms 
Shock to F* Shock to   
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Figure 5. Comparison of Unemployment and GDP Time Series in Denmark and the UK 
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Online Appendix 
 
This Appendix contains information on the calibration of the model, the source of data used, and 
provides the full set of impulses responses for the analysis of the shocks. 
  
1.  Calibration 
Notation Definition   Value 
c          exponent of consumption in the utility function 0.8 
h          exponent of (disutility of) work in the utility function 2.0 
 scale factor on disutility of work in the utility function 58.88 
             subjective discount factor 0.99 
             depreciation rate 0.025 
           (1) elasticity of substitution between intermediate varieties 5.0 
 capital (im)mobility coefficient   0.001 
            (2) elasticity of labour in the C-D composite input 0.709 
             autonomous TFP 1.0 
           (4) worker’s bargaining power  0.246 
            (5) matching elasticity 0.754 
              matching efficiency 0.535 
           (6) job destruction rate  0.038 
e                efficiency of worker training technology 0.70 
   effect of training expenditure growth on training efficiency 0.75 
 elasticity of worker training technology 0.995 
Tx         (7) training expenditure per worker   0.113 
Tx          base value of 
Tx    0.113 
Vx         (7) vacancy creation cost   0.876 
Vq         (8) vacancy-filling probability    0.700 
Uq         job-finding probability    0.490 
U           (9) unemployment (rate) 0.072 
b          (10) unemployment benefit rate  0.124 
f           (11) firing penalty  0.034 
G         (12) general public good  0.186 
T               Tax paid by households (lump-sum)    0.205 
I          (13) private investment 0.166 
C             private consumption 0.570 
M / M* (14) mass of domestic varieties relative to ROW 0.0465 
pd / p*  (15) relative price of domestic and foreign varieties (terms of trade)  1.093/1.236 
 ice-berg trade cost 1.0 
F*             (15) scale factor in foreign demand for domestic varieties 0.415 
r* foreign real interest rate    0.035 
Numbers in parentheses in the first column correspond to the notes below which explain the source of values used in 
calibrations. When there is no note, the calibrated value is determined freely by the implied solution.   
(1)  Targets profit share in GDP of 0.2 (average over 2008-2014).  
 Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sector-accounts/data/ annual-data (business profit shares).  
(2)  Targets labour income share in GDP of 0.5 (average over 2008-2009).  
 Source: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=345.  
(3)  Set relative to the US TFP normalised to unity (average over 2009-2014).  
 Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CTFPPPGBA669NRUG.   
(4)   Set using the weighted average of collective bargaining and union density indices for 2013.  
 Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/43116624.pdf &  https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?    
  DataSetCode= UN_DEN. 
(5)  Set to satisfy Hosios (1990)’s efficiency condition,  +  = 1. 
(6)  Normalised based on the empirical evidence on job separation rates provided by Hobijn and Sahin (2009).  
(7)  Based on simulations of the steady-state equilibrium version of the model calibrated for the UK.  
(8)  Corresponds to the EURO Area average (Christoffel et al., 2009), given the absence of empirical estimate. 
(9)  Values based on quarterly harmonised unemployment rates (average over 2009-2015).  
 Source: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=36324. 
(10)  Targets unemployment benefits replacement rate of 0.23, an approximate value based on evidence provided by  
Nickell et al. (2005) and van Vliet and Caminada (2012). 
(11)  Set such that the firing cost as ratio of average earning is 0.063, based on the strictness of employment 
protection, OECD (2013).  
(12)  Targets the share of government consumption in GDP of 0.209 (average over 2008-2014).  
 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE. CON.GOVT.ZS.  
(13) Targets the share of investment in GDP of 0.1661 (average over 2008-2014).  
 Sources: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sector-accounts/data/ annual-data.  
(14)  Set to ratio of UK GDP to world GDP (average over 2008-2014).  
 Source:  https://knoema.com/mhrzolg/ gdp-statistics-from-the-world-bank.   
(15) Based on a trade to GDP ratio of 0.6 (average over 2008-2014).  
 Sources: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.  
 
 
 
  
  
2. Full set of impulse response functions  
Note: 
*F  and   respectively denote the foreign demand scale factor and iceberg trade cost  
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